Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Bountiful City v. Luis Lee Maestas : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Russell L. Mahan; Bountiful City Prosecutor; Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent.
Aron Stanton; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bountiful City v. Maestas, No. 890054 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1554

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
DOCKET NO

ffiOOSfr
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BOUNTIFUL CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.

Priority No. 2

LUIS LEE MAESTASf

Case No. 89-0054-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from Conviction Entered in the
Bountiful Department of the Second Circuit Court
of Davis County, Utah,
the Honorable Judge S. Mark Johnson, Presiding

Russell L. Mahan (#2059)
Bountiful City Prosecutor
745 South Main
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for the Respondent
Aron Stanton (#3077)
2035 East 3300 South #314
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for the Appellant

FILED
SEP 12 1989
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BOUNTIFUL CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.

Priority No. 2

LUIS LEE MAESTAS,

Case No. 89-0054-CA

Defendant/Appellant•
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal from Conviction Entered in the
Bountiful Department of the Second Circuit Court
of Davis County, Utah,
the Honorable Judge S. Mark Johnson, Presiding

Russell L. Mahan (#2059)
Bountiful City Prosecutor
745 South Main
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Attorney for the Respondent
Aron Stanton (#3077)
2035 East 3300 South #314
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for the Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

CASES CITED

3

STATUTES CITED

3

JURISDICTION

4

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

4

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6

CONCLUSION

12

-2-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED:

PAGE:

1. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988)

7, 8

2. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983)

10

STATUTES CITED:
1 . 78-2a-3 Utah Code Annotated
2. 41-6-44.3 Utah Code Annotated
3. 77-7-15 Utah Code Annotated
4. Rule 103, Utah Rules of Evidence

-3-

4
5, 6, 9, 10
7
10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BOUNTIFUL CITY,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

vs.
Case No. 89-0054-CA

LUIS LEE MAESTAS,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
from a Circuit Court criminal conviction under the provisions
of Section 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case concerns an appeal by the Defendant of his
conviction in the Bountiful Department of the Second Circuit
Court of the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol,
in violation of a Bountiful City ordinance.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether tips from two separate unidentified citizen
complainants, together with corroborative observation by the
police officer, gave sufficient reasonable suspicion for the
officer to approach the Defendant.
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Whether an intoxilyzer affidavit is rendered inadmissable
by the maintenance technician checking the 'yes1 box for the
fixed absorption calibrator test when the particular intoxilyzer
involved was not equipped with a fixed absorption calibrator.
Whether the trial Court committed reversible error in the
admission of intoxilyzer affidavits when the motion of the
prosecution to admit them included a recitation of the
affirmative findings required by 41-6-44.3 and the Judge
granted the motion but did not again recite those findings.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Respondent accepts the Appellant's statement of the
facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The tips of two separate and unidentified citizen
informants, corroborated by the officer's own follow-up
investigation showing the statements of the informant to
have been reliable, justified the officer's reasonable
suspicion that a crime may be being committed.

The officer

was then entitled to approach the running but parked vehicle
and speak to the driver.
When an intoxilyzer is not equipped for a fixed absorption
calibrator test, the fact that the maintenance technician checked
-5-

the

f

yes' box on the intoxilyzer affidavit is not reversible

error.
When the motion of the prosecution to admit the intoxilyzer
affidavit includes a recitation of the affirmative findings
required by Section 41-6-44.3f the Court's granting of the motion
is a ratification of those findings, and they need not be
not be re-verbalized by the Court.
ARGUMENT NO. 1
THE TIPS OF TWO SEPARATE CITIZEN INFORMANTS THAT A PERSON
WASDRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, CORROBORATED BY THE
OBSERVATIONS OF THE POLICE OFFICER, JUSTIFIED THE POLICE OFFICER
IN HAVING A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT A CRIME WAS BEING
COMMITTED.
While Officer Mike Boyle of the Bountiful Police Department
was making an unrelated traffic stop, he was approached by
two separate citizens (page 4, lines 16-17) who informed him
that (1) there was an intoxicated individual, (2) that he was
driving a specific motor vehicle, (3) that the license plate
had a certain number, and (4) he was asking for directions to
the liquor store.
After clearing up the unrelated matter, Office Boyle went
to the liquor store to investigate.

There he found (1) the

vehicle that was described, (2) that it bore the license plate
that was stated, and (3) that it was at the place where they
said it would be.
-6-

At that point Officer Boyle approached the driver of the
vehicle, who had the engine running but had not yet started
to move, and spoke to him.

Officer Boyle was lawful in making

this approach for two reasons.

First, anyone, whether a police

officer or not, can walk up to someone and speak to him.
was not a stop of a moving vehicle.

This

Second, he had a reasonable

suspicion that a crime is being committed.

The Appellant states

that an officer must have probable cause, but this is in
error, as Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended,
requires the lower standard of "a reasonable suspicion."
In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App, 1988), it was
held by the Utah Court of Appeals at page 979:
...in traffic violation stops, in balancing
the rights of individuals to be free from
arbitrary interference by law enforcement
officers and the government's interest in
crime prevention and public protection, if
a hypothetical reasonable police officer
would not have stopped the driver for the
cited traffic offense, and the surrounding
circumstances indicate the stop is a
pretext, the stop is unconstitutional.
In this situation, Officer Boyle's actions are just what
a hypothetical reasonable police officer would do.

Having

received complaints from two separate citizens of a man driving
under the influence of alcohol, and finding the allegations
of vehicle type, license plate and location to be corroborated
by his own observation, he approached the vehicle as it sat
-7-

running but motionless in the parking lot.

It is imminently

reasonable for an officer to do such a thing.

In fact, it would

be unreasonable for an officer to simply turn and walk away.
As Officer Boyle spoke with the driver, he detected the odor
of alcohol on his breath

(page 7, lines 4-5). At that point

all allegations of the citizen informants were confirmed without
a stop of the vehicle.

The officer, with this corroboration

of the witness statements and upon his own observations, moved
on to the field tests of the driver.
These actions pass the balancing test of Sierra.

The

intrusion of the officer in speaking to a driver of a parked
vehicle is trifling, and is outweighed by the governmental
interest in preventing drunk driving.

The officer had the

right to approach the vehicle and speak to the driver just as
anyone else could do, and in any even he had a reasonable
suspicion that a crime was being committed.
ARGUMENT NO. 2
THE FACT THAT THE MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN CHECKED THE "YES" BOX
ON THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVIT WHEN THAT PARTICULAR INTOXILYER
WAS NOT EQUIPPED FOR A FIXED ABSORPTION CALIBRATOR TEST IS NOT
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The intoxilyzer machine which was used in this case was
located at the Bountiful Police Department.

It was one that

was not equipped with a fixed absorption calibrator test (pages
60-61 ) .
-8-

The state regulations on intoxilyzers state:
FIXED ABSORPTION CALIBRATOR CHECK: With the
test card in the printer, run a test on the
fixed absorption calibrator to see that the
instrument gives the correct reading on the
digital display and the printed test card.
THIS CHECK IS NOT REQUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS
NOT EQUIPPED WITH THE FIXED ABSORPTION
CALIBRATOR.
When the intoxilyzer maintenance technician tested this
machine and filled out the respective intoxilzer affidavits
for the tests, the document said as follows:
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE:
( ) Fixed absorption calibrator test (if
equipped) (Reads within +/- .01 of
calibration setting)....

YES

NO

( ) ( )

The technician checked the brackets for "yes."

The

Appellant claims that this means that the affidavit did not
comply with state standards.

This is not so.

By checking

"yes11 the technician was showing that the machine met the state
standards.

The test is not required because the machine is

not equipped for it, as was testified to in court.

The checking

of the 'yes11 box does not make the affidavit inadmissable.
Even if so checking was an error, it was harmless.
ARGUMENT NO. 3
WHEN THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF THE INTOXILYZER
AFFIDAVITS INCLUDED THE RECITATION OF THE FINDINGS REQUIRED
BY 41-6-44.3, THE GRANTING OF THAT MOTION RATIFIED THOSE
FINDINGS AND IT WAS NOT REQUIRED THAT THE COURT AGAIN
RE-VERBALIZE THOSE SAME FINDINGS.

When the City moved for the admission into evidence of
the intoxilyzer affidavits, it was done as follows (pages 14
15):
These are the certificates that are provided by
the highway patrol concerning the Bountiful
intoxilyzer, and I ask the Court to accept those
and to make the findings that - I ask the Court
to make the findings that are required by
41-6-44.3, and as further elaborated in Murray
City versus Hall. That is, that the calibration
of the testing of the intoxilyzer were performed
in accordance with the standards. The affidavits
were prepared in the ordinary course of duties.
That they were prepared contemporaneously with
the testing, and that the source of information
[from] which made and the method [and]
circumstances of their preparation is such as to
indicate that they're trustworthy.
Various objections were raised, there was further testimony,
and the Court ultimately made its ruling (page 62, line 11):
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
and E are received.

Exhibits D

In its granting of the motion to admit the intoxilyzer
affidavits, the Court did not re-state the findings required
by 41-6-44.3.

This is not reversible error.

The prosecution's

motion was two-fold, i.e., to make those findings and to admit
the affidavits.

The granting of the motion was in fact the

Court making those affirmative findings.
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that "error
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
-10-

evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.11
This requirement for error is not met here.

The required

findings were stated in the motion, and the court approved the
motion.

The failure of the Court to re-verbalize those findings

did not in any way affect a substantial right of the party.
Furthermore, when a Court grants a motionf it is not
required that the Judge re-state every term of that motion.
When the motion is granted, unless modified the terms of the
motion as state by the movant are ratified by the Court and
in effect incorporated by reference.
ARGUMENT NO. 4
THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS WERE MADE UPON THE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF THE AFFIANT.
The Appellant claims "the affidavits show on their face
the affiant did not attest from his own personal knowledge.11
This is not supported by an examination of the intoxilyzer
affidavits themselves.

Trooper Dale Neal, who alone signed

the affidavits, states as follows (eliminating the "we" language)
directly in the affidavit:
I..., the undersigned, being first duly
sworn, state that:
1. Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER,
serial number 94001070 located at
Bountiful was properly checked by me.
[Emphasis added.]
*L .

...

3. This was the official record and notes
of this procedure which were made at
the time these tests were done.
-11-

It is clear to be seen that the person making the affidavit
did the tests himself, that the records were made at the time
he did the tests, and that he signed from his own personal
knowledge.
CONCLUSION
The conviction of the Defendant in the Circuit Court for
driving under the influence of alcohol should be affirmed.
Dated this 11th day of September, 1989.
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Russell L. Mahan
Attorney for the Respondent
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